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ABSTRACT 
 Although public safety has long been an integral aspect of planning, issues such as police 
violence and reform have been left to other professions and fields of study. Despite the fact that 
planning policy is executed and enforced by police power, and despite the fact that planning has 
a lengthy history of perpetuating structural inequality that condemns marginalized communities 
to higher rates of police violence and premature death, planners are rarely encouraged to 
consider the intersections of planning and police violence. By reviewing the history of planning 
and policing as interconnected mechanisms of social engineering and control, this research 
attempts to broaden the scope of responsibility for planners to include police violence and 
reform. This research will examine police-community relations meetings as a reform approach 
and demonstrate that while police-community meetings have been praised as progressive and 
innovative reform, city officials and police administrators have actually been using processes like 
the collaborative as far back as the 1960s. This research specifically examines policing in 
Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations launched by 
the City of Albuquerque as a planning process ostensibly to address police violence. However, 
by analyzing power dynamics embedded within the design, process and participation of the 
ACPCR, this research will argue the Albuquerque collaborative served to shore up police 
legitimacy rather than transform policing as it was practiced in Albuquerque.
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APD    Albuquerque Police Department 
ACPCR   Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations 
(colloquially referred to as “The Collaborative,” or the ACPCR)
CPD    Cincinnati Police Department 
CPCRC Cincinnati’s Police-Community Relations Collaborative 
DOJ    The United States Department of Justice 
FHA    The United States Federal Housing Administration 
ISR    Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico 
SWAT    Special Weapons and Tactics teams, refers to special branches of 
US law enforcement which uses specialized military equipment 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, approximately 1,080 people were killed by American law enforcement, 
averaging around three people per day.  Of those killed, about 43% were people of color, and 1
roughly 15% were unarmed.  According to the watchdog website Mapping Police Violence, in 2
2015 30% of people of color killed by police were unarmed. In an article featured by The 
Guardian, journalist Isabel Wilkerson found current statistics of police shootings of black men 
are on par with lynching statistics from the early twentieth century.  Although media coverage 3
tends to focus on victimization of black men, intersectional analyses have shown First Nations 
communities, Latinx, women of color and the LGBTQ community are also at unusually high risk 
of police violence. Moreover, approximately 1 of every 4 persons killed by police suffers from 
severe mental illness. Police violence disproportionately impacts people of color, the poor, or 
people struggling with mental illness, representing a public health crisis for these marginalized 
communities.  In reaction to daily officer-involved shootings, protests across the country have 4
galvanized public debate on police violence and the need for reform. Law enforcement and 
politicians alike consistently respond to public outrage by framing the issue of police violence as 
mere isolated incidents resulting from a “few bad apples.” The Obama Administration’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing characterized rising tensions as a “breakdown in trust” and “rifts 
in relationships,” recommending “inclusive community-based initiatives” to restore trust and 
 “The Counted: People Killed by Police in the United States – Interactive | US News | The Guardian.” 1
2015. Web. 10 Mar. 2016.
 Ibid2
 Wilkerson, I. “Mike Brown’s Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have Too Much in Common. It’s Time 3
for America to Own up.” 25 Aug. 2014. Web.
 Garcia, J, and M Sharif. “Black Lives Matter: A Commentary on Racism and Public Health.” American 4
Journal of Public Health 105.8 (2015): 27–30. Print.
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legitimacy.  However, critics of law enforcement rebuked the administration’s position, pointing 5
out firstly that trust between police and the communities who have historically bore the brunt of 
police violence never existed to begin with. And secondly, the role of law enforcement within 
disenfranchised communities was never to serve or protect, but rather control and incriminate.  
In Albuquerque, New Mexico from 2010 to 2014, 41 people were shot by Albuquerque police 
officers, and 28 of those shootings resulted in loss of life. To offer some perspective, 
Albuquerque, a city of roughly half a million people was experiencing eight times more officer-
involved shootings than New York City, a city of 8.5 million people.  In 2014, Albuquerque 6
police shootings accounted for 20% of total homicides in the city.  Broaden the focus to include 7
officer-involved killings from all agencies (Sheriff and Marshals Service), the number increases 
to 30% of total homicides were committed by law enforcement.  In fact, a study conducted by 8
the Center for Disease Control found that between 2000-2010 the most distinctive cause of death 
in New Mexico was “legal interventions” or “injuries inflicted by the law enforcement or other 
law-enforcing agents.”  In the spring of 2014, while already under federal investigation by the 9
Department of Justice (DOJ) for complaints of excessive force, Albuquerque police shot and 
killed a mentally ill homeless man camping in the foothills of the Sandia Mountains. Video 
capturing the man’s brutal death spurred fury and protest across the city. Not long after, the DOJ 
 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of 5
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015. Print.
  Pinto, Nick. “When Cops Break Bad: Albuquerque’s Police Force Gone Wild.” Rolling Stone. 2015. Web. 6
20 Jan. 2015.
  “Police Violence Reports.” Mapping Police Violence. 2015. Web.7
 Ibid 8
  “The Most Distinctive Causes of Death by State, 2001-2010.” Centers for Disease Control and 9
Prevention. 2016. Web. 20 Jan. 2016.
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released a report finding, among many things, a pattern practice of excessive use of fatal force by 
the Albuquerque Police Department. The mayor’s office replied to the report by issuing a brief 
that denied each and every allegation, 18 denials in total.  10
It is within this context of indifference that the mayor and city council launched the 
Correia, David. “In Federal Court Mayor Richard Berry Denies DOJ’s Allegations of Wrongdoing by 10
APD.” La   Jicarita. 2014. Web.
 
Image 1: “Most Distinctive Causes of Death by State, 2001-2010” (Boscoe & Pradhan, 2015)
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“Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations (colloquially referred to as “The 
Collaborative,” or the ACPCR).” At a press conference, city officials described the ACPCR as a 
“collaborative, not top down” process that consisted of a “series of dialogues focused on creating 
a sustainable action plan to help transform police-community relations.” However, before 
dialogue meetings even started, the collaborative was criticized as a disingenuous distraction 
rather than meaningful accountability. Once underway, criticism of the collaborative only grew 
as community residents complained the process lacked transparency, outreach and engagement. 
For instance, though much of APD’s violence occurred in the southeast and southwest quadrants 
of the city, many dialogue meetings were hosted in the northeast heights. Meeting times, dates, 
and locations shifted from one week to the next, services like transportation and childcare were 
not offered or even considered, and meeting discussion was restricted to finding solutions for 
problems not defined. As the collaborative unfolded and confusion flourished, the questions 
guiding this research began to emerge. If the official position was that there was no problem with 
APD, what did the collaborative actually aim to do? Where did this approach to police-
community relations come from? What accounted for the process? Was it merely poorly 
planned? Or, was the negligence intentional? And lastly, when it comes to police violence, what 
role do planners have in reform?  
Although public safety has long been an integral aspect of planning, issues such as police 
violence and reform have been left to other professions and fields of study. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that planning policy is executed and enforced by police power, and despite the fact that 
planning has a lengthy history of perpetuating structural inequality that condemns marginalized 
communities to higher rates of police violence and premature death, planners are rarely 
encouraged to consider the intersections of planning and police violence. By reviewing the 
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history of planning and policing as interconnected mechanisms of social engineering and control, 
this research attempts to broaden the scope of responsibility for planners to include police 
violence and reform. This research will demonstrate that while police-community meetings have 
been praised as progressive and innovative reform, city officials and police administrators have 
actually been using processes like the collaborative as far back as the 1960s. This research 
specifically examines policing in Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-
Community Relations launched by the City of Albuquerque as a planning process ostensibly to 
address police violence. However, by analyzing power dynamics embedded within the design, 
process and participation of the ACPCR, this research will argue the Albuquerque collaborative 
served to shore up police legitimacy rather than transform policing as it was practiced in 
Albuquerque. 
  "6
Methodology 
To quote professor of qualitative research and feminist methodology, Patti Lather, “just as 
there is no neutral education there is no neutral research.” From the start, this research applied a 
feminist lens with the aim of producing what Lather calls  “unabashedly ideological research” 
that challenges and changes the status quo.  To understand with depth the power dynamics 11
embedded within the planning and policing policy examined in this paper, this research 
employed the following questions: Whose interests were served? Whose interests were silenced? 
What are the implications for those with the least power? Recognizing my own social location 
and subject position, (feminist, woman, graduate student, etc.), this research adopts the position 
that objectivity is a myth and so this research does not aim to adhere to a positivist paradigm of 
qualitative research, or research in general. Therefore, this research is interested in revealing the 
subjectivity of planning and policing policy. 
 Qualitative Data  
From October 2014 to May 2015, I worked with the Institute for Social Research (ISR), a 
research organization at the University of New Mexico. The ISR offers program evaluation and 
policy research in New Mexico, and was tasked with program evaluation of the Albuquerque 
Collaborative on Police-Community Relations. As a graduate research assistant, my primary 
responsibilities included attending collaborative meetings, collecting field data, and compiling 
observational and comparative reports. Out of 23 total meetings, I was present for 16. The 
meetings were mostly open to the public, however, of the 16 meetings I attended, 3 were 
 Lather, Patti. “Fertile Obsession: Validity after Poststructuralism.” The Sociological Quarterly 34.4 11
(1993): 673–693. Web.
  "7
privately held sessions. In addition to qualitative data, I collected all literature given out at 
meetings.   
For each of the 16 meetings, I recorded most interactions from pre-dialogue meeting 
mingling to post-dialogue lingering. These interactions included, but were not limited to, 
meeting introductions and ground rules, participant-to-participant interactions and body 
language, as well as participant and facilitator interactions. I used classic participatory 
observational methods that yielded approximately 80 pages of field notes. Participants were 
assigned numerical identifiers to protect privacy. Participants were asked by city officials to 
register prior to the meeting date in order to staff dialogue meetings with the appropriate number 
of facilitators. In some cases, if there were numerous participants, the meeting was split up into 
smaller sub-groups, each group containing at least two facilitators. One facilitator would record 
notes while the other facilitator guided discussion. The ISR often assigned more than one 
researcher to attend. However, on occasion there was insufficient ISR staff coverage for some 
meetings, or some sub-groups. For this reason, and for other triangulation purposes, this research 
utilizes reports produced by facilitators. Participants were told facilitator reports were available 
upon request. Facilitator reports used in this research were acquired through the request of 
members of the public.  
The ISR did not have an established evaluation research protocol; research focus and 
guidelines were developed through an iterative process. This includes guidelines for the 
collection of specific qualitative data like participant performance, body language, or the 
collection of quantitative data like demography. Initially I attempted to track basic demography 
like gender, race, and age, as well as uniformed participants (law enforcement, first responders, 
etc). However, neither the city officials responsible for organizing the collaborative nor ISR 
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leadership identified demographics as an important source of data to collect. All of my field 
notes, as well as facilitator notes acquired by the public, were coded and analyzed with the 
qualitative data software Atlas T.I. This process helped to expose, and weigh the value of, 
various themes raised in dialogues.  
Literature Analysis
Within the meetings, knowledge was disseminated not only in the form of dialogue but 
also through printed literature. For example, Albuquerque city staff provided a guide for 
discussion, as well as a meeting calendar, and a meeting evaluation form. Occasionally the APD 
provided informational brochures. Some meeting participants brought in their own literature to 
share with the larger group. Materials provided at the meetings were analyzed by looking at how 
information is presented, who the literature was created by, what audience the literature aimed to 
engage, and what, if any, issues are raised in the literature. 
Quantitative Data
Attendance: An obvious way of analyzing the reception and momentum of the meetings is 
through participation and attendance. The Albuquerque collaborative was modeled after a 
process that took place in Cincinnati. Cincinnati’s collaborative has been praised as a model 
primarily because participation was considered high, with around 3,000 people participating in 
surveys and/or meetings. The ISR produced a final report for the city offering amongst other 
things, an accounting of the number of unique meeting participants, as well as an estimate of 
repeat participants. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE LONG HISTORY OF PLANNING AND POLICING 
To understand the Albuquerque collaborative process, this research looks to planning 
theory and history as a guide. How can planning inform a thorough analysis of the nature of the 
Albuquerque collaborative process, who it served, and who it silenced? In the essay, “High 
Authoritarian Modernism,” scholar James C. Scott opens his examination of state power with a 
metaphor on maps, emphasizing that although maps chart out seemingly ordinary information, 
what and who is represented in the map is just as telling as what and who is missing from the 
map. Understanding who is performing the charting versus who is being charted can expose 
telling power dynamics as well. Because, as Scott points out, “transformative power resides not 
in the map, of course, but rather in the power possessed by those who deploy the perspective of 
that particular map.” Maps, like blueprints and zoning ordinances, illustrate more than just 
graphic representations of space, they reveal the power structure and value system of those 
deploying plans and policies in our cities.  
The modernist state, according to Scott, was rooted in Western industrialization and 
guided by a philosophy of progress and growth. Science, technology, rationality, and order were 
the means to a utopian end of “control over nature including human nature.” “The path from 
description to prescription” was paved, standardized, and future-fixated. Tradition and the natural 
world were relics of the past and “the past is an impediment, a history that must be transcended.” 
To actualize progress and order the state necessitated three things: 1. A vast administrative 
apparatus to count and track everything and everyone. 2. Absolute use of state power to realize 
plans. 3. An ineffectual citizenry to minimize resistance. In other words, the state in it’s infinite 
wisdom and power, projected values, norms, and agendas on a vulnerable civil society. Because 
progress and order could be inserted anywhere, social engineering of the human experience 
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stretched from the personal to the public. Order of this scale, in which physical and social space 
were arranged according to a particular set of values and norms, required not only a monopoly 
on power but also the use of force. Giving rise to what Neocleous’ refers to as the “regimented” 
or “well-ordered police state.” As a result, police jurisdiction encompassed “everything that 
might be necessary to maintain order within a community.”   12
Jane Jacobs might have summarized the modernist planning approach as “top-down 
planning,” wherein communities were planned upon, not planned with.  Power dynamics were 13
hierarchical and reinforced through knowledge production and application. The state and state 
actors, be they politicians, academics, or professionals, claimed to be acting in the best interest of 
communities, whether or not communities agree. In the interest of time, this kind of planning 
process limited public input as the public lacks the expertise and skills necessary to make and 
Neocleous, M. The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power. Pluto Press, 2000. 12
Print.
“Police Violence Reports.” Mapping Police Violence. 2015. Web.
 Greenspan, Elizabeth. “Top-Down, Bottom-Up Urban Design.” The New Yorker. N.p., 2016. Web.13
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achieve plans. Le Corbusier, considered one of the most influential architects and urban planners 
of the modernist movement, is credited with saying, “Revise the shelter and one improves the 
people.” In hindsight, critics contend Le Corbusier and the modernist movement “can now be 
better understood as equal parts optimistic and fascistic.”  Systems, institutions and policy, Scott 14
warned, can become vectors of repression and oppression. 
Image 2: Detroit Mayor Mayor Albert Cobo (1950-1957) pointing to areas slated for redevelopment 
(“Detroit: The Blood that Never Dried”, 2017) 
The extensive federal urban renewal and revitalization projects of the postwar era 
personified the modernist paradigm. With the Housing Act of 1949 and 1954, Congress ratified a 
25 year plan to modernize cities by focusing on slum clearance and redevelopment. Police power 
and eminent domain gave politicians and planners the authority to execute massive urban 
renewal projects. Although “police power” is commonly regarded as a legal term defining the 
state’s ability to regulate, protect, and/or advance “the health, morals, safety or general welfare of 
the community,” it is also instructive to consider police power as a literal mechanism used to 
dispatch plans and enforce laws. Throughout history, police have been complacent administrators 
of destructive and discriminatory laws. During this period of redevelopment, officers were 
regularly deployed to intimidate, harass, and evict tenants.  Accomplishing redevelopment 15
projects meant families were dispossessed, communities uprooted, and whole neighborhoods 
 Hill Lamont, Marc. Nobody: Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and 14
Beyond. New York, NY: Atria Books. Print.
 Ibid15
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flattened to build luxury apartments, corporate buildings, and highways. Many who lost 
businesses or homes, did not receive adequate compensation or relocation assistance.   16
Urban renewal, many planning scholars recount, did not operate in a vacuum. The 
perception of poor neighborhoods as “slums” underpinned sweeping “regenerative” development 
policy, which disproportionately destroyed low-income communities of color. By 1966, Urban 
Renewal projects were responsible for leveling approximately 400,000 housing units, over 
300,000 families were displaced, half of which were people of color.  Though legislation 1718
specified for every housing unit demolished a new unit would replace it, many of the displaced 
simply relocated to other impoverished neighborhoods, exacerbating congestion and poverty. 
Furthermore, as part of the renewal vision, massive high-rise public housing projects were 
erected in place of dilapidated tenements. Towering housing structures packed in thousands of 
tenants, concentrating poverty like never before. Containment in public housing projects also 
affected how marginalized communities were policed, in that public housing became spaces of 
surveillance and persecution.   19
While the Housing Act transformed urban cores, the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) financed white flight to the suburbs. White flight, the out-migration of white Americans 
from increasingly diverse inner cities to more homogenous, commuter belts, accelerated 
suburbanization and expansion of the highway system. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 
 Bernstein, Andrea et al. “Transportation Nation | Back of the Bus: Race, Mass Transit and Inequality.” 16
WNYC.    Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
 Collins, W. J., and K. L. Sister. “The Economic Effects of Slum Clearance and Urban in the United 17
States.” Vanderbilt University. 1-42, Sept. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
 Bullard, Robert D. The Black Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics. 18
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. Print.
Denvir, D. “Criminalizing the Hustle: Policing Poor Peoples Survival Strategies from Eric Garner to 19
Alton Sterling.” 2016. Web.
  "13
provided the roads for white, middle class America to commute easily from sanitary suburbs into 
“cleaner” city centers for work and retail.  Massive highway plans were often located in the 20
heart of black neighborhoods. Highway construction bisected whole communities and devastated 
prosperous economic corridors. Whereas the roads and highway system favored and freed white 
America, transportation planning ostracized and imprisoned black communities as thoroughfares 
became physical manifestations of color and containment lines.  
It is within this context of planning and policing, whereby both systems worked together 
to evict, segregate, and control that police violence catalyzed some 300 riots in predominately 
black communities between 1964-1972.   In response to the rebellions, President Johnson 21
blamed poverty as the culprit justifying the administration’s urban renewal programs. However, 
critics of Johnson's poverty reduction initiatives, namely Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and James 
Baldwin, noted that the razing of poor and black communities under the guise of “renewal” or 
“revitalization” to the detriment of people of color, actually led to further instability within black 
communities.  As police in the south enforced Jim Crow, northern police enforced urban 22
renewal evictions or what Baldwin aptly termed “Negro Removal.”   23
The Johnson administration responded to waning public and political support of urban 
renewal by creating the Model Cities program as part of the War on Poverty. Model Cities aimed 
 Avila, Erica, and Mark H. Rose. “Race, Culture, Politics, and Urban Renewal: An Introduction.” Journal 20
of Urban History 35.3 (2009): 335–347. Print.
 Camp, Jordan T., and Christina Heatherton. “Thug Nation: On State Violence and Disposability.” 21
Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter. London: Verso. 15–33. Print.
 Hill Lamont, Marc. Nobody: Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and 22
Beyond. New York, NY: Atria Books. Print.
Baldwin, James. Conversations with James Baldwin. Jackson and London: University Press of 23
Mississippi, 1989. Print.
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to address the “physical, economic, social, educational, and health needs experienced by 
residents of the most chronically impoverished urban neighborhoods.”  However, many have 24
characterized Model Cities as an ambitious program, too ambitious considering the scope and 
scale of the program’s mission, which necessitated much more funding than was allocated. At the 
same time, in reaction to increasing tension between law enforcement and marginalized 
communities, the Johnson administration released the 1967 report on the police, called the Task 
Force Report: The Police. The report largely focused on the various challenges police faced and 
barely mentioned misconduct or abuse of power as contributing to the social unrest of that 
time.  The report did introduce community planning and policing as a method of stemming 25
crime. According to the report, bringing the community into policing would not only serve crime 
reduction goals, but also provided opportunities for good public relations as the rebellions or 
“riots” represented a crisis of legitimacy for law enforcement.  
By the time the report was published, approximately 38% of cities with populations of 
over 100,000 were experimenting with various “police-community relations” measures. Cities 
piloting police-community relations measures included San Francisco, Houston, Newark, 
Dayton, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Richmond, St. Louis, and the list goes on.  2627
Police-community relations took two primary forms: 1. “Team-policing” wherein police officers 
were designated to regular beats (neighborhoods) under the premise that police officers could 
build better relationships by interacting regularly with community members to address public 
“Making Sense of Model Cities.” Urban Omnibus. 2016. Print.24
 Greene, Helen Taylor, and Shaun L. Gabbidon. Encyclopedia of Race and Crime. Sage Publications, Inc, 25
2009. Print.
 Ibid. 26
  Department of Justice. “Task Force Report: The Police.” 1967. Web.27
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safety issues (a central tenant of what we know today as “community-policing”). 2. “Police-
Community Relations Units,” varied in their purpose, some units were simply a public relations 
office that disseminated information to the press, while others hosted community meetings with 
the aim of bringing the community and police together to discuss crime and safety concerns.  28
                "  
In many ways the Police-Community Relations Units epitomized Scott’s classical “top-
down planning.” Police-Community Relations Units were organized entirely within departments 
without any supervising body and therefore self-regulating. The hierarchy of power and 
importance one could argue was expressed in the mere phrasing of the relations units: Police-
Community Relations Units, “Police” first, “Community” second. Rules of engagement were 
prescribed for community members prior to participation, again, also expressed in the phrasing: 
“Police-Community Relations Units”. The community, at the behest of the police, would relate. 
 Johnson, D, and R Gregory. “Police-Community Relations in the United States: A Review of Recent 28
Literature and Projects.” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 62.1 (1971): 94–103. Print.
Image 3:  Ebony Magazine feature on one of the early police-community 
collaboration models (Ebony Magazine, 1969) 
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Police-community relations meetings were usually designed by professionals or academics who 
led community members and police officers through the process. Meeting structure ran the gamut 
from role-playing to guided conversation.  Meeting logistics, like guidelines for discussion, 29
meeting location, and selected participants, were managed by organizers.  The community, not 30
considered an equal or enforcer, was not consulted in the process of creating the relations units. 
The community would not control, counsel, or monitor the police. Participants included police 
officers, community members, and local leaders. In most settings, there were equal numbers of 
community participants and police officers. Power dynamics were stratified, with meeting 
organizers sharing the same rank and prestige as officers after which community participants 
followed. Officers often attended meetings dressed in uniform, and some meetings were even 
held at police departments.   31
Although officers participated in the police-community relations unit meetings, many did 
so begrudgingly. In one study conducted by Yale University mental health professionals, 
community members and police officers were instructed to role reverse, wherein community 
members played the role of officer, and officers as community bystanders. Community members 
enjoyed role-playing as they felt they were able to show officers how they often felt forced to 
bend to the will and whim of law enforcement’s irrational discretionary power. In response, 
police officers became defensive and angry, threatening to abandon the meetings. The issue of 
“blame” came up repeatedly in that police officers were hesitant to participate because they felt 
  Klein, E, C Thomas, and E Bellis. “When Warring Groups Meet: The Use of Group Approach in Police-29
Black Community Relations.” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 6.2 (1971): 93–99. Print.
 Bittner, Egon. The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current 30
Practices, and Possible Role Models. 1970: 1-119. Print.
  Bell, R et al. “Small Group Dialogue and Discussion: An Approach to Police-Community 31
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they would be forced to endure unfair finger-pointing.  In some situations, either based on 32
presumption or based on real accusations made by community members during meetings, police 
officers outright refused to participate.   33
Outcomes from the police-community relations meetings varied. Some participants were 
recorded as feeling better understood by officers as well as developing better understanding of 
officers. Other relations meetings buckled under the tension of defensive police officers and were 
terminated prematurely.  In the article, “Police Responsiveness to Minority Community Needs,” 34
the researcher documented police-community relations units “cherry-picking” participants 
sympathetic to police to attend meetings so as to avoid having police authority challenged while 
still giving the impression that police departments were engaging with the community.  “When 35
Warring Groups Meet: The Use of Group Approach in Police-Black Community Relations”, an 
article from 1968 described how community members were merely tolerated and ultimately 
dismissed as complainers. And in some cases, those leading the discussions were observed siding 
with officers.   36
Based on the literature, it is hard to say whether the police-community relations units 
meetings were a success or failure. The relations meetings certainly seemed to benefit police. To 
begin, the meetings did not change power dynamics, police authority might have been 
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challenged but remained in tact. As well, police officers were not any more accountable for 
misconduct after meetings than before. Meetings gave police the opportunity to socialize 
community members by imparting their knowledge and expertise. From the community’s 
perspective, however, the meetings offered little in the way of relief. Meetings did not increase 
community capacity or access to power or justice. Rather, meetings shifted focus away from 
holding law enforcement accountable to making communities responsible for understanding 
police.  
The turmoil and transformation emblematic of the 1960s signaled a crisis of state 
legitimacy. Marginalized communities across the nation were fighting for rights historically 
denied them. Planning and policing deepened instability within the communities they sought to 
order and control. Under pressure, both systems experimented with new methods considered 
inclusive, participatory, and community-based. Oddly enough, while the Johnson administration 
recommended law enforcement incorporate community planning and partnerships with 
marginalized communities to improve relations, police departments were also stockpiling 
military-grade weaponry.     37
The piloting of police-community relations units marked the beginning of a shift in 
policing ideology from what is known as the Professional era (1930-1970), to the Community-
Policing era (1980-present). Community policing consists of three primary aspects: 1. Some 
version of problem-oriented policing, in which crime is understood within a larger context 2. 
Prevention of disorder and crime 3. Partnership between police and the “community” to 
prioritize and address public safety and crime concerns. However, while law enforcement 
agencies pivoted rhetorically towards community cooperation, in actuality departments were 
 Camp, Jordan T., and Christina Heatherton. “Thug Nation: On State Violence and Disposability.” 37
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anything but community-oriented. With the War on Crime, then the War on Drugs, bipartisan 
expenditure on law enforcement budgets continued to grow, bolstering militarization of local 
police departments particularly urban inner cities.  Since 1980 police budgets have 38
quadrupled. ,   The Reagan administration in particular increased federal spending on street 39 40
crime and drug-law enforcement by providing incentives to local departments willing to make 
the drug war top priority. In turn, local law enforcement agencies received military equipment, 
technology and training.  The deployment of Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) 41
increased from a couple hundred in 1972, to three thousand in 1980, and thirty thousand in 1996. 
In the book, The New Jim Crow, author, Michelle Alexander, described how incentives to local 
police department wrecked havoc in communities all under the guise of community 
policing,“Drug arrests skyrocketed, as SWAT teams swept through urban housing projects, 
highway patrol agencies organized drug interdiction units on the freeways, and stop-and-frisk 
programs were set loose on streets.”  
It is within this context that the seminal article shaping community policing as we 
currently understand it is published. In the article, “Broken Windows, The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety,” social scientists, James Wilson and George Kelling, focus on crime 
concentrated in “disorderly” neighborhoods. Wilson and Kelling argued that signals of disorder, 
like a broken window, gave the criminal element an impression of neglect, putting communities 
  Gascon, G, and T Foglesong. “Making Policing More Affordable: Managing Costs and Measuring Value 38
in Policing.” 2010. Print.
 Ibid39
 Reaves, B, and M Hickman. Police Departments in Large Cities, 1990-2000. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 40
2002. Print.
 Danksy, K. War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing. New York, NY: 41
ACLU Foundation, 2014. Print.
  "20
at risk for more crime. According to Wilson and Kelling, disorder encouraged deviant behavior, 
by rooting out low-level delinquency like jaywalking or public-intoxication, a community is able 
to avoid more serious crime. With broken windows (also known as “order-maintenance 
policing”), law enforcement increases its presence and expands discretionary powers of 
individual officers as a means of identifying disorder.   
Examination of the path from Kelling and Wilson’s “description to prescription,”  reveals 
some serious concerns. First, determining what and who is “disorderly” and “orderly” is in the 
end a judgment call. From a community-development planner’s perspective, “disorder” such as a 
broken window can be understood as signals of disinvestment or structural inequality. Problems 
resulting from structural inequality demand social service-oriented solutions, like investment in 
education, employment, and affordable housing. However, from the Broken Windows lens, 
“disorder” is simply a precursor to crime and the perception by police of poor neighborhoods as 
“disordered” combined with vast police discretion to “stop and frisk” the disorderly, has meant 
poor communities have been the target of arbitrary policing. Despite being pitched as race-
neutral, studies have shown officers are more likely to “stop and frisk” and arrest people of color 
for low level offenses. Though police officials and politicians defend “stop and frisk” as 
preventative and proactive rather than reactive to crime, many scholars and activists contend the 
practice has led to widespread violation of constitutional rights as well as advancing 
criminalization of communities of color and the poor, mass incarceration, and officer-involved 
shootings.   42
Wilson and Kelling in their own article recognized the potential for police abuse, “How 
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do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry? We 
can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question.” Kelling maintains that while 
Broken Windows was never intended to be a mass arrest program, that is how it has played out in 
many cities, most notably in New York City. In an article, “Don’t Blame My ‘Broken Windows’ 
for Poor Policing,” Kelling acknowledges that while the policing strategy relies on discretionary 
power of police officers, police are expected to utilize the “least intrusive means” and collaborate 
with community partners (social workers, clergy, medical professionals) to address order 
maintenance issues.   43
Some of these “least intrusive means” of collaboration have translated into law 
enforcement creating their own community partners. For example, the Police Athletic League 
(P.A.L.), a nonprofit that pairs officers with young people for mentorship. Some experts suggest 
such organizations foster positive interactions between law enforcement and young people. 
Other police led programs include, “Coffee with a Cop” a program that hosts events usually at 
local coffee shops wherein community members can meet and talk with law enforcement “to 
improve trust and build relationships one cup of coffee at a time”; the Citizens Police Academy 
is a program lead by local police departments that engages citizens in a curriculum modeling 
cadet training with the aim of “producing informed citizens.” Even community relations 
meetings, like those discussed in this research, are pointed to by police and political leaders as 
creating lasting community partnerships. Critics, however, question the intent of these tactics, 
suggesting that these programs simply offer law enforcement favorable media attention while at 
the same time working to indoctrinate the community to be uncritical of law enforcement. 
Author Naomi Murakawa advises community members to pay attention to what community-
 Kelling, G. “Don’t Blame My ‘Broken Windows’ Theory For Poor Policing.” Politico. 2015. Web.43
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policing says versus what is does, that the various law enforcement led community programs 
are merely the face of community policing. Adding that departments invest in public relations 
experts to better manage their image with the media while so-called community policing 
continues to militarize departments and victimize the poor and people of color with violence. 
As this review shows, planning and policing in general, and community policing more 
specifically, have a much longer, complicated, and contradictory history than the public is lead to 
believe. If police violence has persisted even with community-based policing reform, what 
purpose do the police-community relations meetings serve? Particularly in times of intense 
scrutiny, the police themselves become champions of community policing and community 
meetings. Should that not be a signal to investigate further what police have to gain from the 
meetings? In the next section, this research will argue that these community meetings serve to 
restore legitimacy to police departments struggling to maintain their authority by redirecting 
attention away from accountability to appropriated community spaces that manufacture consent 
and acquiescence through bureaucratic processes and police propaganda. 
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CHAPTER 2: ALBUQUERQUE, NM POLICE-COMMUNITY COLLABORATIVE 
In the wake of protests and national negative media attention, Albuquerque Mayor Berry 
hired consultants, Scott Greenwood and Tom Streicher, to assist with DOJ negotiations as well as 
deteriorating police-community relations. Streicher, former Cincinnati chief of police, and 
Greenwood, a civil rights attorney, were both involved in the DOJ reform of Cincinnati police 10 
years prior. Not long after hiring Streicher and Greenwood did the mayor introduce city 
initiatives aimed at improving police-community relations. Specifically, Mayor Berry launched 
City Council Resolution R-2014-052, “establishing a community outreach process known as the 
‘Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations.’” The Albuquerque Collaborative 
on Police-Community Relations (ACPCR) was a series of meetings bringing police and 
community members together for mediated dialogue as a means of “transforming police-
community relations.”  
The Albuquerque collaborative was adapted from a process in Cincinnati called the 
“Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative” (CPCRC) that has been praised by 
experts as an effective model for police reform and police-community relations repair. Like so 
many other police departments, Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) had been the focus of 
federal investigation following accusations of racial profiling and excessive use of force. Only 
weeks after a suit was filed against CPD, did officers shoot an unarmed young black man. 
Cincinnati’s Over the Rhine neighborhood, a majority-black community, responded with a week 
long rebellion calling for justice. As part of the settlement to the suit, the affected parties were 
instructed to alternatively resolve issues through a dispute resolution method of collaborative 
dialogue. Dialogue meetings would bring together police and community members for 
conversation on solutions for improved relations. All in all, about 3,500 people participated in 
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Cincinnati’s Police-Community Relations Collaborative. Because the process was mandated by a 
court, goals for improved relations would be incorporated into a legally binding settlement 
agreement between CPD, the city, and litigants. Many have been quick to promote Cincinnati as 
a model for other cities confronting police reform and police-community relations.  However, 44
this research questions whether the praise is merited. Although the dialogue process was an 
attempt to collaboratively resolve issues amongst litigants, although the court mandate appeared 
to raise the status of citizen-participants, although goals reached through the CPCRC were 
theoretically binding, power dynamics prior to and throughout the process have raised concerns. 
Furthermore, the collaborative did not bring victims of police violence closer to justice or 
 Rothman, J., and Land, R. “The Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative.” Criminal Justice, 18.4 44
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improve accountability mechanisms.  Additionally, CPD harassment and violence continues to 45
plague Cincinnati’s communities of color.   46
Analysis of the Albuquerque collaborative derives directly from my observation as a 
graduate research assistant employed by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) to collect 
qualitative data from collaborative meetings. This analysis follows a chronology of meetings I 
attended beginning October 2014 and ending April 2015. By examining the planning process of 
the ACPCR, power dynamics expressed through the process, and who the ACPCR served and 
silenced, this research will demonstrate how use of the collaborative as a bureaucratic planning 
process establishes and reinforces the authority of the state, the police, and city officials. This
research applies Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation model to understand how the police-
community meetings distributed or concentrated power. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen 
Participation ranks eight types of citizen participation along a ladder, with the least powerful 
position at the bottom rung and the most powerful position at the top rung. The ladder hierarchy 
beginning with least powerful participation type is defined as Manipulation, then, Therapy, 
Informing, Consultation, Placation, Partnership, Delegated Power, and Citizen Control at the top 
considered the most powerful ranking for citizen participation. 
Analysis of Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations  
The ACPCR started with a “Mayor’s Kick-Off” meeting held at the Albuquerque 
Convention Center on October 21, 2014. The room was situated so that panel speakers were on a 
stage facing the audience. Most of those in the audience were uniformed police officers. 
 Weichselbaum, S. (2014). Cincinnati: Ferguson's Hope or Hype? Retrieved January 03, 201745
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According to a meeting pamphlet, the collaborative was coordinated by the Office of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and the Office of Diversity and Human Rights in collaboration with the 
Mayor’s Office and Albuquerque police. Lead Facilitator, Kathleen Oweegon, opened the 
meeting by stressing two points:  
1. The city is seeking to draw the largest base of participants, and therefore solutions, 
through the dialogue process. 
2. Optimum success will come from “evoking collaborative dialogue rather than 
combative”. 
Next, Albuquerque Mayor Berry briefly described the process and emphasized the collaborative 
as a “tremendous opportunity”. Next, City Council President Sanchez offered information 
regarding negotiations with the DOJ, and characterized the ACPCR as a “defining moment.” On 
behalf of APD, Chief Eden affirmed the department’s commitment to collaborative efforts for 
improved community relations. Lastly,  Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Tyson 
Image 5: Mayor’s Kick-Off for the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-
Community Relations (KRQE)
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Hummel, outlined the collaborative process step by step. The ACPCR included a triphasic 
process, concluding with Phase 3:
The resolution identified stakeholders to be engaged in the ACPCR and included:  
The collaborative was limited to specific questions that included: 
1. What are your goals and expectations for police-community relations in Albuquerque?
2. What are your goals and expectations for police-community interactions and conduct in 
Albuquerque? Why are these goals and expectations important to you (what experiences, 
values, beliefs, feelings influence your goals)?
Table 1: The three phases of the ACPCR as outlined by Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Coordinator, Tyson Hummel
Table 2: Stakeholders to be engaged in the ACPCR
Mental Health Community and Related 
Service Providers 
First Responders 
Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected 
Citizens 
Faith Based Community 
Business Community Access to Justice Organizations  
Underserved Communities Non-Profit Organizations 
Educators and Academic Community Government and Policy Makers 
PHASE DESCRIPTION
ONE Listening, consisting of stakeholder meetings in which meeting participants 
provide suggestions for improved relations through a dialogic process 
facilitated by contracted mediators and guided by a framework of questions. 
TWO Processing, involves a process of condensing information culled from 
meetings.
THREE The point at which suggestions become components of community action 
plan disseminated by the community, APD, and city government.
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3. How do you think your goals can be best achieved?
4. What are your specific suggestions and ideas
The Kick-Off event for the ACPCR seemed to set the tone for what would follow over 
the coming months. The meeting was solely informative and restricted public comment to 
questions at the end. Although, Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Tyson Hummel, 
described the collaborative as “inclusive, collaborative, and not top-down,” a power structure 
within the process was apparent as the panel of speakers was made up exclusively of city 
officials and lacked any community representatives. None of the speakers made mention of 
collaborating with community organizations in preparation of the ACPCR, nor was there a call 
for community activists to assist in the planning process. When commentary was opened to the 
floor, the few community members in attendance voiced concern about the event’s poor outreach 
and publicity. One woman identified herself as a member of APD Forward, a community 
coalition, stating she had not received any notification about the event or upcoming police-
community relations meetings. Others asked what kind of information the city was looking for 
and whether recommendations from the ACPCR would be integrated into the consent decree. 
The last community member to speak was Mike Gomez, local resident and father whose son had 
been killed by APD in 2011. Directing his question to the mayor, Gomez asked, “Do you feel  
APD has a problem?” The mayor replied, “The DOJ is identifying challenges.” This particular 
exchange is important to highlight leading up to the collaborative meetings, as neither the mayor 
nor the chief publicly acknowledged any problem with or wrongdoing by Albuquerque police. 
Moreover, the DOJ wasn’t just “identifying challenges.” According to the DOJ findings letter, 
APD’s unlawful policing “stems from systemic deficiencies in oversight, training, and policy. 
Chief among these deficiencies is the department’s failure to implement an objective and 
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rigorous internal accountability system.”  In other words, APD did have a problem, many 47
problems, and in the context of the ACPCR, the mayor’s stance undermined any sincerity of the 
process. 
 In contrast, the resounding message by the public was that Albuquerque police were out 
of control and needed to be held accountable for their actions. Like Mike Gomez, the community 
was calling for acknowledgment and justice. Despite a mountain of evidence provided by the 
DOJ, those in positions of power (namely the mayor and APD chief) were redirecting the 
conversation away from APD’s history of violence to a future of improved police-community 
relations. In effect, by rejecting any misconduct and focusing on solutions, one could argue the 
ACPCR was serving to render APD’s violence invisible. By reframing the narrative, setting the 
Correia, David. “In Federal Court Mayor Richard Berry Denies DOJ’s Allegations of Wrongdoing by 47
APD.” La Jicarita. 2014. Web.
Image 6: A “not top down” pamphlet for ACPCR
  "30
ACPCR agenda, limiting who had access to decision-making, and excluding and devaluing the 
concerns of the lesser powerful, the mayor was reinforcing a power structure, value system, and 
norms. Strategies for how to move forward were not co-produced by city officials and the 
community, power was not shared. Rather power was concentrated and strategies were imposed. 
Preparation of the ACPCR did not appear to be “inclusive or collaborative” as proclaimed. Had 
the city engaged the public in preparation of the ACPCR, had the city fostered community 
ownership and legitimacy the kick-off meeting presumably would have reflected the community 
and community priorities.   
The first collaborative meeting took place on a Monday evening, October 27th 2014 at 
6pm until 9pm. This meeting focused on the stakeholder group “Mental Health Community and 
Related Service Providers.” There were over 30 people in attendance of which maybe five were 
uniformed police officers. This meeting was held at a community center called the North 
Domingo Baca Multigenerational Center in the northeast heights suburb of Albuquerque. By car, 
it took about 20 minutes to get from Downtown Albuquerque to the center. By bus, Google Maps 
estimated travel time was about two hours. The meeting location posed accessibility concerns, 
especially when considering meeting coordinators did not offer any transportation or carpooling 
options. Much of the police violence has been centralized in the city’s southeast and southwest 
areas, if participants from these areas wanted to attend and were relying on public transportation, 
getting to this location could have taken three to four hours round trip. In that case, many people 
would need to set out an hour so before meeting start time and plan on not returning home or 
wherever until well after 10pm.  
The meeting was located in a large auditorium and split into two groups. Each group had 
two facilitators, one facilitator took notes while the other guided participants through discussion 
  "31
questions. Participants sat in rows that were positioned in half circles facing facilitators and a 
screen. Participants who had registered were told to sit in the front rows, those who had not 
registered were told they could only observe and had to sit in the outer rows. Facilitators 
emphasized that attendees register if they wanted to participate so that meeting organizers could 
adequately staff each group. Many attendees appeared confused that they could not participate 
when they were unaware of a registration component. This raised questions about community 
outreach and engagement prior to launching the collaborative. As well, this specific aspect of not 
allowing the “unregistered” to participate in discussion raised questions as to the process’ 
approachability and openness. Additionally, discussion questions were posed in succession, 
which meant facilitators were asking questions to participants one by one. In this way there was 
not much actual dialogue or exchange between participants. Furthermore, because discussion 
was limited to “goals” and “solutions,” there was no discussion about police violence or the DOJ 
investigation, or accountability or justice. Rather, conversation was abstract and rendered the 
problem of police violence nonexistent.   
The second meeting “Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected Citizens” was held in 
the same location in the northeast heights, Saturday, November 8th. There were considerably less 
people compared to the first meeting, and no identifiable police officers in attendance. The 
meeting was split into two groups in two separate rooms, with most of the participants filling the 
first room. People eventually filed into the second room, however because there were less people 
than had registered there was some confusion as how to proceed. Leading facilitators to 
encourage observers and those who had not registered to participate for a “more generalized 
conversation.” In contrast to the first meeting, although meeting discussion was restricted to the 
questions on goals participants strayed from the script to voice their frustrations with APD. 
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When participants raised concerns about police violence or abuse of power, facilitators 
continuously redirected discussion back to the prescribed questions. In some instances, ACPCR 
facilitators appeared annoyed by participants unwilling to jump into goals.  For example this 48
excerpt from the facilitator report:   
With a couple of exceptions, the overall input by participants was profuse with harsh criticism for 
the police department and the Mayor. Although the facilitator did her best to keep the meeting on 
track, most of the participants seemed to need to ventilate their anger and frustration with past 
events, and seemed not yet ready to focus enough on the future to answer the questions put forth. 
The participants seemed to feed off each other as they used phrases such as ‘Dismantle this out of 
control monster’; ‘It’s a 6 bit badge pinned on a 2 bit person’; and ‘Only one percent of 
Albuquerque Police are professional.’ A few of the participants expressed that they felt the 
process was useless and would not accomplish any changes. Others expressed gratitude for the 
opportunity these dialogues provide. Some of the participants felt they were not involved in a 
dialogue with each other and were frustrated with their inability to have a conversational 
exchange. The level of frustration and anger for some was high evidenced by the shouting, the 
passion, and the lack of respect for the process. 
To be clear, this particular meeting was for “Aggrieved Families and Affected Citizens,” there 
were participants who had actually been victimized by police. Despite the facilitator’s 
characterization, the reality is that many residents attended meetings looking for accountability, 
assuming the ACPCR might be a means to that end. Instead, community members, invited to 
their own community centers by city officials, were expected to participate in conversation that 
was sanitized or summarily revisionist. Furthermore, criticism was not isolated to the police, 
participants also began criticizing the collaborative process. At this meeting, participants 
remarked on the meeting location, and one participant referred to the northeast heights as the 
“northeast whites.” Facilitator notes reflect this complaint: 
People were concerned about why this topic was in this location. Why is this stakeholder group in 
this area of town? It should be in the Cesar Chavez Community Center: or the International 
Zone..People in those areas have had more negative interaction with police than these areas the 
NE Heights. This is ‘Whiteyville.’
  Terhorst, R. ACPCR Facilitated Meeting Report: Aggrieved Families and Personally Affected Citizens. 48
Albuquerque, NM: Mayor’s Office, 2014. Print.
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Although organizers of the ACPCR explained the intent to stagger meeting times and location 
was meant to optimize participation, many found the meeting locations and schedule hard to nail 
down as there was no consistency. Participants also brought up police involvement in the 
collaborative. For some, the police presence was intimidating, leading some participants to 
wonder whether police participants might stifle conversation.  For others, police participation 49
was welcomed. Interestingly, participants who wanted police to attend meetings also admitted to 
not having much interaction with police in general, let alone negative interactions. This issue of 
lack of consent, of not asking the community what it wanted or needed as resolution prior to 
implementing a process, surfaced in meeting conversation again and again, demonstrating a 
process that was inherently “top-down.”  
The third meeting for “First Responders” was held at the Palo Duro Senior Center, 
Monday, November 17th 3:30pm to 6:30 pm. The time of the meeting is important to highlight 
for a couple of reasons. First, many people are still working during these hours. Secondly, 
participants had indicated at other meetings that the schedule was difficult to nail down as dates, 
times, and locations kept changing. Why collaborative coordinators did not take the time to 
survey participants to find out which days and times would best accommodate participants is 
unclear. This location was also about a 15 minute drive from Downtown, and about an hour trip 
using public transportation. This meeting was split into two groups in two separate rooms. There 
were about 20 people in attendance, with many police officer participants as this was the “First 
Responder” stakeholder group. Community members seemed impressed that police officers were 
participating in the meeting. Similar to the first meeting, this group did not discuss APD’s 
 Ibid49
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violence or police violence in general. Rather than addressing “goals for police-community 
relations,” officers were given more leeway to express thoughts outside of the scripted meeting 
questions. For instance, one officer complained that the community, not just the police, need to 
be held accountable,  
Accountability for the community, not just police, false allegations are happening more 
and more. The media is infamous...folks trying to set-up officers, take responsibility for 
behavior 
Although police participants were “venting” and complaining, facilitators did not redirect them 
back to the questions. Furthermore, the facilitator reports did not even record officers complaints 
of biased media, or lack of community and individual accountability, as complaints. Instead, the 
facilitators reframed the complaining as expertise and knowledge,  
Unlike previous dialogues, representatives of the Albuquerque Police Department were 
present as participants. Their presence added a dimension not previously experienced. 
The group seemed to be much more cohesive and they demonstrated a team approach to 
the answers to questions. There was a good interaction between participants as they 
processed the questions. The police were able to answer questions about procedures that 
allowed for mutual understanding.  All citizen participants expressed their appreciation 
and joy at having the officers present. 
While police participants dominated meeting discussion, the absence of any talk about police 
violence was stark. A co-researcher also observing the discussion, turned with a confused 
expression and whispered, “You wouldn’t be able to tell there’s a problem. We are here because 
there is a problem.”   50
By the fourth meeting, “Faith Based Community,” officers were outright denying there 
were any problems with police. This meeting was hosted by the Highland Community Center, 
more centrally located in the Nob Hill area of Albuquerque, Wednesday, December 3rd 2014. 
There were about 9 people in attendance with two officer participants. As soon as meeting 
 Terhorst, R. ACPCR Facilitated Meeting Report: First Responders. Albuquerque, NM: Mayor’s Office, 50
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conversation started, one of the officer’s introduced himself by stating,
I’m a sergeant with APD. Looking at the questions, I also want to help change. It is not us 
against them. Cops are also part of community. Don’t pay attention to everything in the 
news, the sky is not falling, there is no racial profiling here. I don’t know about other 
departments. But this is not about race. I’m mixed.
When community participants attempted to raise concerns about police violence specifically 
affecting people with mental illness, officers took over the conversation by accusing the city and 
state government of not properly funding treatment. Facilitators recorded this sentiment in their 
report noting, “APD officers are not professional mental health providers therefore discrepancies 
exist as to how officers should deal with mental illness on the streets.” Officers went on to blame 
the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) for prescribing drugs to inmates, they also blamed 
lack of involvement by families and schools with early intervention. Any accusation of police 
misconduct was met with dismissal or deflection. The conversation became so skewed that 
during a break, one woman left the meeting to go to a vigil organized by the Black Student 
Union at UNM because that’s where she felted she “needed to be.”  
The fifth meeting held Saturday, December 13th 2014, for the “Business Community and 
Neighborhood Associations” was again located at the North Domingo Baca center in the 
northeast heights. This meeting also consisted of two groups split up into two rooms. There were 
no APD officer participants in the group I observed, though one of the participants was a former 
sheriff from California. The other group did have officer participants in attendance. Although the 
facilitator opened the meeting by saying, “people come into meeting with old upsets, we need to 
focus on the future,” some participants raised concerns about news reports of APD violence, 
militarization of the police, and police culture as violent and racist. The conversation appeared to 
include more open analysis of police, whether this is a result of the lack of officers as part of this 
specific group I cannot say. However, the facilitator notes from the other group with APD 
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officers recorded similar themes as past meetings with officers. For another example, an officer 
from that group was noted as saying, “if you want police officers who are calm, collected, 
educated, who know how to handle themselves, you need to pay them more. You get what you 
pay for.”   51
The sixth meeting was a privately held session for the Chamber of Commerce. Though 
most meetings were opened to the public, a few were closed. As far as this research is aware, the 
ACPCR hosted about three private sessions including: 1. Chamber of Commerce, 2. Domestic 
Violence/Substance Abuse Network 3. Sankofa Men’s Group (a grassroots network of black 
men). Why these sessions were privately held is still unknown. These meetings were not listed 
on the collaborative calendar. It is not clear how they were organized, if the groups reached out 
to city coordinators, or vice versa.     
In January I was absent for two meetings “Access to Justice Organizations and Providers” 
and “Minority and Underserved Communities.” “Educators and the Education Community” was 
the seventh meeting I attended but was the ninth meeting of the schedule. This meeting located at 
the Highland Community center in the Nob Hill neighborhood of Albuquerque, had three groups 
in different rooms. The group I observed had about 8 participants, 4 were police officers. 
Although this stakeholder group was designated for the education community, only one 
participant was a retired teachers. This meeting, much like past meetings with officer 
participants, focused very little attention on police violence and spent a great deal of time 
criticizing individuals and institutions. Many officer participants accused the educational system 
of not teaching children respect for law enforcement. Additionally, officers accused the media of 
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misrepresentations. On the other hand, when a community member expressed concern for police 
militarization an officer participant swiftly interrupted her to explain how “the public must be 
careful with misconceptions.” He went on to say that the military vehicles acquired by police 
departments were “hollowed out of their military gear” and that military vehicles can be 
beneficial to the community for instance if there was a school shooter. Another officer said that 
because New Mexico is one of the poorest in the country, combined with the recession, 
unemployment is high, graduation rates are low and crime is rising. “These factors have led to a 
more dangerous criminal. Criminals who would like to hurt police.” Police violence if not 
completely erased from the conversation was reframed to position officers are victims. Again, 
because the community was the problem and not the police, solutions for improving police-
community relations centered on positive press of police work, officer visits to local schools, or 
police ride-alongs so that the community could better understand what police deal with daily. 
One participant suggested requiring new drivers watch a public service announcement about 
police before receiving their license.  
The next meeting, “Government and Policy Makers” was held Wednesday, February 11th 
2015 at the Highland center in Nob Hill. This meeting consisted of three groups in three different 
rooms. The group I observed had a total participant count of 9, four of which were uniformed 
officers. Like so many of the other meetings dominated by police participants, many of the same 
police narratives were noted. For instance, “police are part of the community too,” “there are 
‘bad apples’ in every job,” “we need trust and respect.” Surprisingly, some community members 
challenged these assertions. One community member in particular stated, “The reason we’re here 
today is not because they did a good job. It’s they didn’t do a good job. The difficulty of the job, 
I think that’s been overused.” The police officers in the room exchanged glances and one officer 
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responded by saying, “Police are not mental health professionals, we are not clinicians. Police 
cannot fix all societal problems.” Though police participants were continually establishing 
themselves as experts in the meetings, when criticism of police surfaced officers often deflected 
attention away from culpability by claiming the opposite, they weren’t psychologists, they 
weren’t social workers, there were bad apples in every job, and the community expected too 
much from them.     
After a while, meetings became fairly predictable. If officers were present, the 
conversation usually focused on police as victims. Victims of poor wages and working 
conditions, of negative media coverage, of violent criminals. Rarely would discussion 
acknowledge police violence in general, or APD violence specifically. Though police officers 
ranted and finger-pointed just like community members, their complaining and blame was 
reiterated as authority and expertise. On the other hand, if police officers were not in attendance, 
community members seemed more comfortable to verbalize concerns and criticism. Although, 
some community members were unphased by police participants and continued to raise 
misgivings about APD and the collaborative process. Still, when community members criticized 
APD of violence or misconduct reaction by officers proved reliable. “Neither the police nor the 
community is perfect,” “police commands need to be honored, ” and “police need community 
support.” 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSION 
The Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations worked to silence 
criticism of APD by mapping out specific parameters for conversation. Informational pamphlets 
provided at each ACPCR meeting described in detail acceptable conversation subject matter. 
Pamphlets included ground rules, an explanation of what dialogue is and can do, meeting 
agenda, and the specific questions facilitators would ask participants. “What are your goals and 
expectations for police-community relations?” “What are your goals and expectations for police-
community interactions?” “How do you think your goals can be best achieved?” and “What are 
your specific suggestions and ideas?” These questions were not designed by accident. Focusing 
on the future, not the past, focusing on defining goals, not problems served to render APD’s 
violence invisible. Essentially, absolving APD of any blame and therefore accountability. This is 
the exact scenario that played out in Cincinnati, the city from which Albuquerque adopted the 
collaborative model. In preparation of the Cincinnati collaborative, the program director, Jay 
Rothman, held meetings with city and police administration, and suit plaintiffs to discuss various 
approaches to the dialogue process. Rothman proposed a problem-identification method, which 
encourages individuals to define the problem and share their experiences as part of a greater 
conflict resolution and healing process. Defining and framing the problem also helps to pinpoint 
specific solutions. However, when Rothman proposed this method, police leadership refused it. 
To police and city attorneys, “If the process was adversarial, they would prefer simply to take it 
to court since they denied wrongdoing.” “The police and city attorneys,” Rothman noted, “were 
unwilling to engage in an effort to define a problem...that they simply did not agree existed.” In 
response, Rothman substituted the problem-identification approach for a “goal-oriented” process 
so as to keep police from abandoning the process altogether.
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Similar to Albuquerque, Cincinnati’s process was described as “bottom up, participatory 
and inclusive.”  However, there could be no clearer contradiction than police officials and city 52
attorneys wielding their power and threatening to leave the process if there was the slightest hint 
of criticism. The use of power by police officials and city attorneys to control the dialogue 
process was distinctively “top down” planning as the powerful few were able to determine and 
direct the process for all. In retrospect, Rothman lamented capitulating to the pressure, “I believe 
I gave in to this resistance and these fears too quickly. I did not spend adequate time explaining 
how a problem framing process need not be adversarial, but rather can reveal mutual 
misunderstandings...”  The goal-oriented approach was a misstep Rothman thinks severely 53
inhibited Cincinnati’s collaborative process as individuals were forced to solve for problems not 
defined. Concentrated decision-making reinforced power structures and dynamics, effectively 
silencing those who might have been critical of police, those who also happened to have the least 
amount of power.  
Whatever the reason, preventing the potential for criticism seemed to be an intentional 
strategy for the Albuquerque collaborative. Rather, ACPCR meetings seemed to discourage 
criticism that implicated law enforcement. Because on the contrary, a fair amount of 
conversation was devoted to blame. As shown throughout this research, police participants and 
those sympathetic to the police regularly accused the media of sensationalized portrayals of 
police violence. Or blamed the community’s lack of understanding of police work for 
misperceptions. Or blamed schools and parents for not properly teaching students to respect law 
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enforcement. Or blamed terrorism for increased militarization of police. Or complained about the 
lack of personal responsibility of those who find themselves the target of negative police 
attention. Though meeting conversation was to focus solely on goals and solutions, community 
members who did not follow dialogue guidelines were continually returned to meeting questions. 
Officers, on the other hand, were given more latitude and frequently took advantage of a captive 
audience. Officer narratives usually followed two threads: blame or complaints. Complaints 
about how poorly APD was staffed, how poorly police officers are paid, how dangerous police 
work is, how often criminals made false allegations of brutality, how police are part of the 
community too, how police officers are just trying to do their job, how a “few bad apples” 
become the focal point of mainstream media, how the good things officers do go unreported, 
how lapel cameras don’t tell the whole story, how expectations of officers are unreasonable, how 
community members should not question an officer’s authority, how innocent people do what 
they’re told, how the community lacks understanding, how the community needs to support 
police. Embedded in the subtext were binaries that polarized participant discussion: with us or 
against us, pro-police or pro-reform. Victimhood was narrated by police and appropriated from 
those actually victimized by police violence. Discussion centered on understanding the danger of 
police work, but there was little understanding of the danger faced by communities most affected 
by police violence. These accusations aimed at the community and individuals critical of law 
enforcement, were reflected in the collaborative’s report of compiled goals, which included: 
Community Education, APD/Community Communication and Collaboration, and lastly, 
Improvements to APD.  
Considering the community was the problem and not law enforcement, ACPCR meetings 
became a space for police propagandizing. For example, APD spokeswoman, Celina Espinoza, 
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handed out a brochure titled “What should I do if I am stopped by a police officer?” Participants 
were told to search YouTube for a video made by APD that supplemented the brochure. Officers 
encouraged participants to visit and “like” APD’s Facebook page to get information on crime 
alerts, or updates on all the good work APD was doing. ACPCR planners passed out a sheet of 
“community initiatives” that included “talkwithacop.com,” a website for “anyone who would 
like to submit praise, questions or concerns” to APD, and “Coffee with a Cop” wherein 
businesses or community organizations can host an event for officers and community members 
to “discuss community issues while building relationships.” A participant of the ACPCR, whose 
son was an officer, passed out bumper stickers that said “ Albuquerque Moving forward with 
APD.” Officers also spoke to community members’ fears about crime, telling them to call their 
area substation commander to schedule shift meetings in their neighborhood to show more police 
presence.  
Though the terms “community” and “collaboration” were used repeatedly in the ACPCR 
meetings, the community was a guest in an invited space. The community’s role was restricted to 
accessory, not collaborator. There was little to no decision-making shared with the community 
prior to the meetings, and limited decision-making opportunities throughout the process. 
Employing Arnstein’s “Ladder of Participation” the ACPCR process could be best understood as 
“Consultation” wherein community input is solicited but “not combined with other modes of 
participation...and offers no assurance that citizens concerns and ideas will be taken into 
account.” Because the Albuquerque collaborative was only driven by the City Council 
Resolution and not mandated by a court as in Cincinnati, long-term commitment to the 
collaborative process and goals gleaned from the community remains unclear. According to 
Arnstein, “when powerholders restrict the input of citizens’ ideas to this level participation 
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remains just a window-dressing ritual.” Or as one participant from the Albuquerque collaborative 
described the meetings as “political theater.” Despite the public’s demands for justice, despite the 
DOJ findings of a pattern of excessive use of force, despite the District Attorney indicting the 
officers who shot and killed James Boyd, and in spite of advice from its Cincinnati predecessor 
of the importance of engaging in honest discussion not placation, the ACPCR meetings diverted 
attention away from accountability to acquiescence. Not surprisingly, only about 250 people 
participated in the Albuquerque Collaborative on Police-Community Relations. Individually, the 
above issues were conceivably innocent missteps. However, combined, poor planning, lack of 
transparency, the lack of community engagement and outreach gave an impression of the 
ACPCR as a negligent distraction.  
Since ending the ACPCR, Mayor Berry’s hired Cincinnati consultants have been mired in 
controversy. Both Streicher and Greenwood have billed the city for costly meals and bar tabs, as 
well as lodging that included a $100 pet-boarding fee. Greenwood, who was supposedly ordered 
not to fly by his doctor, racked up about $15,000 in travel expenses alone.  Additionally, it was 54
discovered that both Streicher and Greenwood have connections to APD’s taser contractor, Taser 
International as both men have acted as public endorsers of Taser International products.  55
Moreover, Greenwood’s contract has raised concerns. Originally, the attorney was contracted 
with the city for about $70,000 in services, which meant city council did not need to approve his 
hiring. However, the mayor’s office has requested an additional $280,000 to pay Greenwood’s 
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continuing legal fees.  As for the collaborative’s report on goals and action plan that would 56
supposedly “transform police-community relations,” neither the city nor APD has provided any 
status updates. This research was not able to locate any information as to whether any strategies 
from the collaborative have been implemented or objectives achieved. This research did find that 
in 2014 several members of the Police Oversight Board (POB) resigned, and more recently the 
POB accused the chief Eden of not complying with discipline rules. 
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CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS 
What to do? Rather, what was already being done? While city officials were busy 
creating a space that actively erased APD’s violence with the Albuquerque Collaborative on 
Police-Community Relations, community activists and organizers were working towards the 
exact opposite. In direct response to community appeals for acknowledgment and accountability, 
community organizations conducted a six-month investigation from September 2014 to February 
2015 interviewing people across the city routinely affected by police harassment and violence. 
The investigation culminated into a report, “Targeted: Prejudice and Racial Bias in the 
Albuquerque Police Department,” and corroborated findings by the Department of Justice that 
APD violated citizens’ rights with excessive force between 2009-2011. However, whereas the 
DOJ limited its examination to specific allegations of excessive force for a two-year period, this 
people’s investigation documented a very long history of systemic racism, rampant violence and 
harassment within APD. The 2015 report was presented at the People’s Tribunal on Police 
Brutality. Tribunal activists spoke openly and pointedly about APD’s volatility and impunity. 
Unlike the Albuquerque collaborative, the People’s Tribunal provided more than just ornamental 
placation, the tribunal recognized the value of community consent and community knowledge. In 
addition to thoroughly recording APD’s unconstitutional policing of marginalized communities 
in Albuquerque, the report also provided numerous “expectations.” Some of the expectations 
included: community oversight and outreach, decriminalization of the homeless, accountability, 
and transparency to list a few.   57
The People’s Tribunal is just one local example of how communities are creating counter 
spaces that challenge dominant narratives on police and police violence. Protests across the 
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country have galvanized public debate on police violence. Social movements such as Black 
Lives Matter have raised the national conversation to consider connections between unjust 
policing and unjust policy that has kept the racialized poor over-policed and under-protected. 
Many activists and scholars are renewing calls for prison and police abolition, not reform. 
Advocating for the complete dismantling of the prison and police system as we know it.  What 5859
would replace local law enforcement varies depending on who is asked. Some are organizations, 
like Cure Violence in Chicago, are experimenting with unarmed mediation and intervention 
teams as means of resolving community conflict. Other community spaces are offering “peace 
circles” wherein community members are welcome to share experiences of being hurt and 
hurting others. Proponents of the peace circles contend this method of conflict resolution has 
been practiced by indigenous cultures the world over when people were figuring out how to 
solve problems without modern day police.  Other activists suggest abolishing police and 60
investing comprehensively and equally in communities through services like restorative justice, 
education, and health care and mental health services that work to nurture people rather than 
neglect.       61
As for the collaborative itself, it is not the position of this research that the collaborative 
could have been improved. The aim of the collaborative was not to heal wounds by holding 
honest dialogue that would air honest problems and then yield honest solutions. Nor was the aim 
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of collaborative to hold a violent police department accountable. As far as this research found, 
the purpose of the collaborative was to retrench the power structure and power dynamics through 
a public process posing as community-based and collaborative. The collaborative worked to 
silence the critics, propagandize the skeptics, and stroke the supporters. However, if Albuquerque 
collaborative coordinators wanted to improve their process they would not have had to look very 
far. For instance, in order for the Cincinnati collaborative to be successful, in that community 
members would actually participate, a vast public awareness campaign was launched prior to the 
dialogue meetings. As well, an advisory council made up of litigants to the suit, helped lend 
legitimacy and ownership from the start of collaborative process. Albuquerque did not appear to 
dedicate as much time or resources on an outreach or engagement effort. This was reflected in 
the total amount of participants, about 250 in Albuquerque versus 3,500 in Cincinnati. Although 
Mayor Berry and his hired consultant, Greenwood, had expected “‘thousands and thousands’ of 
Albuquerque residents to share their vision for APD,” this was simply not the outcome. Even 
simple cost effective options like promoting the Albuquerque collaborative through social media 
sites such as Facebook or Twitter was not, to the knowledge of this research, pursued. Moreover, 
it was disclosed by city officials that the local advertising agency responsible for promoting the 
ACPCR was coordinated by APD, posing a potential for conflict. If APD did not perceive the 
collaborative a priority, the budget for the collaborative could have been suppressed. Effectively 
reinforcing the utility of community engagement in preparation of the ACPCR. An advisory 
council of community leaders and activists representing various stakeholders could have lent key 
insight and expertise for logistics like when and where to hold meetings, whether the ACPCR 
could find volunteers to provide childcare for participants, carpooling for those with 
transportation barriers, how to best utilize existing resources for outreach, and the like. 
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The meetings, like the violence, are not new. And what took place in Albuquerque is not 
unique. If approaches to reform, like these community meetings, have not stemmed the violence 
or brought to heel more officers, can their use still be justified? Moreover, reviewing the history 
and interdependence of planning and policing, can planners honestly take a backseat to the issue 
of police violence? Planning as a profession, like it or not, has depended on the violence of 
police power to execute and enforce projects and plans. Continuing to deny this reliance on 
police power makes planners complicit partners to state-sanctioned violence. Continuing to 
support measures simply because the language is familiar or comforting, is not only shortsighted 
and a waste of taxpayer dollars, but also serves to further marginalize those most vulnerable to 
police violence. With so many legitimate community-driven and community-based alternatives, 
maybe now is the time to imagine a world without police. Because really what do we have to 
lose? A world with fewer dead marginalized peoples and fewer institutions maintaining 
inequality is a world worth envisioning.
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